Great Expectations
Three Probabilistic Scenarios for the Trump-Putin Summit
Dear all,
I’m happy to be back writing today’s Irregular column after a busy few months in geopolitics where I’ve been focused on supporting our clients through consistent geopolitical upheaval.
With a newly expanded team at Geopolitical Strategy — more about which next week — today I’ve found the time to examine possible outcomes from the upcoming August 15 summit, to be held in Alaska, between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin regarding the war in Ukraine.
Forecasting outcomes is always fraught with difficulty. The issues on the bargaining table are complex. Leader-level discussions often diverge from officials’ preparatory talks – especially when Trump is involved (as the Swiss would attest). And, most fundamentally, achieving perfect foresight would require mind-reading abilities which – full disclosure – we do not possess.
We have nevertheless been spending a lot of time with clients lately, guiding them through the various ways in which the Ukraine War, these upcoming talks, and broader Russia-West relations could develop over coming weeks, months and years.
Given the importance of the matter, I wanted to share some insights. If you are interested in learning more, including through a briefing by one of our senior advisors who have variously served as ambassadors to Russia, Germany, NATO the EU, the WTO and the UN feel free to reach out. Otherwise, I hope you find the below analysis useful.
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Prisoners of History
This upcoming summit will be the first face-to-face encounter between Trump and Putin since 2019 and the first time Putin has undertaken a bilateral visit to the United States since 2007. Notably, that was the year Russian foreign policy took a more assertive and combative turn – Putin had grown fed up with NATO’s eastward expansion, gave up on hopes of deep cooperation with the West, and stepped up actively confronting Russia’s Western-leaning neighbours (Georgia the following year, then Ukraine in subsequent years).
This meeting comes against a backdrop of attritional conflict and war fatigue across all sides. At the same time, Washington has been ramping up pressure on Moscow’s revenue streams: Trump has imposed new “secondary tariffs” on countries buying Russian oil – starting with India, where tariffs on Indian goods were doubled to 50%. He has threatened to hit other Russian oil customers (including China) with even higher rates if Moscow doesn’t quickly cease hostilities in Ukraine. Putin will arrive in Alaska under increasingly heavy economic pressure and while Russia has a notoriously high pain tolerance, “secondary tariffs” could hurt more than traditional and largely baked-in sanctions.
Trump’s recent turn to peacemaker as a political brand has also increased the pressure. In just a few months, he has brokered or claimed credit for peace agreements, ceasefires and truces in conflicts spanning multiple regions – India and Pakistan (May), Israel and Iran (June), Cambodia and Thailand (July), the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda (June), and even, just last week (in Russia’s traditional backyard), Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Whether driven by Nobel Peace Prize ambitions or not, Trump’s playbook has become increasingly clear: use US leverage (economic and military) to push parties toward deals, then tout himself as “peacemaker-in-chief”. He intends to do the same in this case, despite having missed his self-declared 24-hour goal to end the Russia-Ukraine by over 200 days.
Both leaders consider only – and exclusively – the United States and Russia can end the war and that does suggest a deal of some kind is plausible.
For Trump, the focus on direct engagement is based in his belief that others do not “hold the cards”: only Putin, not Zelenskyy or European leaders, can stop Russian aggression. For Putin, it’s because, to him, the Ukraine War is in large part a proxy conflict with NATO, which he regards as an extension of the United States; the battleground may be Ukraine, but the fight is really with the West. On that view, only Trump can decide how the war ends on the Western side.
Conditions might thus be ripe for a deal – that is, if Russia even wants a deal, an issue our Chief Strategist Michael Feller wrote about in detail on Saturday in his article “What Putin Wants” for our GD Professional subscribers, and which I would encourage you to read.
Even if Trump and Putin are both inclined to strike a mano-a-mano bargain, implementation would require broader buy-in from key player who will not be in the room. And while they may not “hold all the cards”, they do hold some and their views will condition what negotiation theorists call the “zone of possible agreement.”
Alaska Hold’Em
Most important, of course, is Ukraine.
Above all, Kyiv wants survival with sovereignty – a path to restoring its territory, binding Western security guarantees, a clear EU accession timetable, substantial reconstruction financing, and justice mechanisms to hold Russia accountable. Ukrainian officials have flatly rejected any peace agreement that involves ceding their land to Russia. Any agreement that seriously disregards Ukraine’s core interests will raise extremely challenging questions about whether it fights on with diminished, or extinguished, American support.
Next most important are the views of NATO allies in Europe, which want to uphold deterrence and credibility and which are now Ukraine’s greatest backers. That means any ceasefire or peace must not reward Russian aggression or sideline Ukraine. European leaders seek enforceable limits on renewed Russian coercion, continued military and economic aid to Kyiv, energy stability, and visible unity of the Western alliance throughout the process. Any outcome that sidelines their interests, including simply on being consulted, will land flat and trigger extremely challenging decisions about whether to diverge with the United States and continue to directly support Ukraine irrespective – and in what form and for how long.
While less directly involved, China and India’s interests also shape the negotiating context. Broadly, Beijing’s interest is in a contained conflict that it can live with. China wants to keep enjoying discounted Russian energy (it imported about $62.5 billion worth of Russian oil in 2024). And it wants to maintain a pliant-but-intact Moscow as a junior partner aligned in its opposition to American primacy. China also relishes opportunities to play a calm, predictable, mediator role on the world state and portray a contrast with unpredictable leadership from the White House. Interventions with the potential to exacerbate tensions between the US and NATO allies are a bonus. At a minimum, it certainly doesn’t want to be left out of any major discussions shaping the global order.
India, for its part, wants to preserve its access to cheap Russian crude (roughly $52.7 billion in Russian oil imports last year) and to maintain its longstanding defence and diplomatic ties with Moscow, while repairing its relationship with Washington. India is smarting from Trump’s new tariffs and hopes to see those secondary tariffs lifted; at the same time, it insists on its strategic autonomy and expects recognition for the balancing role it plays between great powers.
Amid these divergent dynamics and priorities, what then is the possible common ground? We see three scenarios as plausible outcomes from the Alaska summit.
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Tsar Bucks
A first scenario can be characterised as no comprehensive deal with only minor concessions.
In this scenario, the Alaska meeting produces no formal deal – just a handful of limited goodwill measures or minor concessions that allow both sides to save face. This outcome would essentially maintain the status quo (continued conflict) with only cosmetic improvements. For example, Trump and Putin might agree on a few small deliverables such as a prisoner-of-war exchange, a new protocol to avert incidents around nuclear facilities, or a temporary reboot of the Black Sea grain corridor – but without any ceasefire or steps to stop the fighting. In essence, they’d paper over the failure to reach a broader accord by highlighting these narrow areas of “progress,” then leave all the tough issues (like territory, sanctions, and Ukraine’s status) for another day. And they may well essentially delegate “the details” (i.e. absolutely everything of importance) to Ukraine and Russia, claiming the United States had done the hard work setting the pre-conditions for peace and from then on it would be up to the them.
A “minimal progress” outcome of this sort would allow Putin to keep pursuing his maximal war aims unhindered by any new restraints – indeed, Moscow might prefer this if it believes time and battlefield attrition will eventually lead to a significant breakthrough. Putin would have conceded nothing irreversible and could say he didn’t shut the door on diplomacy, all while continuing military operations.
Trump, for his part, could claim he tried diplomacy but didn’t give away anything important or lift core sanctions. He could point to the small humanitarian or tactical agreements as evidence that he can work with Putin, even as he holds firm on bigger demands. In Washington, this might be spun as “testing the waters” with talks without rewarding Russian aggression. The net effect: the war grinds on, Putin’s ambitions remain alive, and Trump moves on while saying the ball is in Putin’s court – having extracted a few symbolic measures to tout, but fundamentally no change in the trajectory of the conflict. Secondary US measures (like tariffs on India and others) would likely stay in place or even escalate as Trump continues to pressure Russia indirectly.
Our assessment is that this is the most likely outcome — with about a 50% likelihood. Without Zelensky or the EU at the table – no progress can be made on the substantial issues. Russia is making incremental progress on its territorial goals and continues to degrade Ukrainian defences through large-scale air strikes. Trump’s base continues to want out of foreign conflicts, combined with pressure from the Israel-Gaza situation, we are likely to see a continued US exit, enabled by a good news story from the summit.
New STOP Treaty
A second possibility is a limited “pause” deal – essentially a ceasefire packaged as if it were significant progress.
In this scenario, Washington and Moscow agree to a renewable ceasefire along the current battle lines in Ukraine, coupled with practical de-escalation steps along the lines of Scenario 1, but augmented: a large prisoner-of-war exchange, guaranteed humanitarian access to affected areas, nuclear safety measures to secure the Zaporizhzhia power plant, and a reopening of grain and fertiliser export corridors through the Black Sea under some revised international inspection regime.
There might be some narrow sanctions carve-outs to facilitate this deal – for example, licensed payment channels for strictly humanitarian transactions or specific energy trades, exempting those from the broader sanctions net – and possibly a token “peace monitoring” arrangement on the ground involving a few acceptable neutral countries.
This would not be anything resembling the “lasting peace” that Ukraine and Europe ultimately seek; rather, it would be a way to dial down the violence while kicking thornier issues down the road.
Still, such a package would allow each side to claim a win. For Putin, it would deliver many of his minimum demands: territorial gains held in fact (even if not recognised in law), a respite that slows Western re-armament of Ukraine, and a script for domestic propaganda that he “secured Russia’s objectives.” For Trump, it would provide a visible de-escalation he can trumpet at home – a claim to have “stopped the killing” – all while keeping the main sanctions architecture and secondary trade restrictions in reserve as leverage.
Notably, this kind of interim deal could also be grudgingly acceptable to Kyiv and Europe: Ukraine would get a breather to rebuild forces, train on new Western systems, and deepen its bilateral security guarantees, while Europe would gain greater energy predictability going into winter without feeling that it fundamentally compromised on principle. The likely result of a managed pause would be frozen front lines, a sharp reduction in active hostilities, somewhat stabilised (if still regulated) commodity flows out of the region, and a sanctions regime essentially intact save for a few narrow, reversible exceptions.
Our assessment is that this scenario is unlikely — say, a 30% chance — but possible. Ultimately, for Russia, gaining territory slowly is preferrable to a halt, especially with Ukraine on the backfoot with waning air defences and depleted manpower. Putin will see a temporary halt as a chance for Ukraine to re-arm, re-man and recover. However, if Trump can sweeten the deal with enough sanctions relief, Putin may see this as an opportunity for longer term economic recovery, whilst maintaining territorial wins.
A Grand Bargain
Finally, there is an outside chance of a dramatic “grand bargain” – not in the form of a signed peace treaty but as a headline understanding or gentlemen’s agreement on the broad strokes of a final settlement.
This would be the most far-reaching (and controversial) outcome, essentially aiming to reset Russia–West relations in one swoop.
In practice, this could mean Trump and Putin emerging from the meeting with an oral agreement that gestures toward ending the war on terms much closer to Putin’s liking.
For instance, a ceasefire coupled with tacit acceptance that Russia will retain administrative control over all the Ukrainian territory it currently claims (Crimea and parts or all of the four eastern/southern regions Putin annexed) without formal Western recognition of those annexations. Ukraine would be declared “neutral” (no NATO membership, perhaps codified by Ukraine itself in a constitutional amendment), and extensive sanctions relief and tariff rollbacks promised to Russia in phases as it complies with the ceasefire and other terms. The two presidents might also agree to set up a new bilateral US–Russia mechanism to manage disputes and avoid military incidents (a nod to great-power détente), and to restart talks on arms control and strategic stability.
Such a grand bargain in principle would, on paper, aim to end the Ukraine war and “bring Russia in from the cold,” resetting relations after years of hostility. For Putin, it would be an almost maximal win from this summit: de facto international acceptance of Russia’s territorial seizures (even if Western capitals won’t say it out loud, they would be tolerating it), a clear guarantee that Ukraine won’t be joining NATO, and the beginning of the end for crippling sanctions – not just token exemptions, but a real pathway to having Russia’s economy reconnected to global markets. Additionally, Putin would get the prestige of negotiating global order issues directly with the US on equal footing.
For Trump, it would be a made-for-TV victory moment: he could declare that he “ended the war” in Ukraine (framing it as ending America’s involvement in a distant war), claim credit for lowering global energy prices (as Russian oil comes back fully online, if sanctions ease), and even hint at business opportunities in post-war reconstruction (positioning US companies for contracts). It’s the kind of big “deal” Trump often says only he can make.
However, the constraints and backlash to this scenario would be enormous.
Such an understanding – especially if done without Ukraine at the table – would be anathema to Kyiv and most European countries, who would see it as rewarding aggression and betraying fundamental principles. It could ignite a political firestorm in Washington too: Congress (even many Republicans) would likely balk at any move that looks like appeasement or abandonment of Ukraine. And history provides sober warnings: nearly every past attempt at a US–Russia “reset” built on grand statements rather than hard guarantees has eventually collapsed in mistrust or differing interpretations.
In short, while a grand bargain might be what Putin and Trump personally would love to achieve, turning that into a durable reality would be challenging – but far from impossible: we would give it a 20% chance.
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The Bottom Line
No matter which of the above scenarios (or combination thereof) comes to pass, none will mark a return to pre-war normalcy. Some consequences will likely run through all outcomes.
For one, the machinery of Western sanctions, export controls, oil price caps, and compliance regimes will remain a permanent feature of the economic landscape. Even in a peace deal, these tools are here to stay as leverage and can be snapped back or expanded if Russia backtracks. And even if the US promises sanctions relief, this would require Congressional approval and the EU and UK may not follow suit – at least on the same timeframe or in the same way, creating further compliance challenges for firms.
International law will continue to take a backseat to raw geopolitics. The war has underscored that power politics often trump legal principles – any ambiguous deal or frozen conflict outcome would reinforce that reality.
Ukraine’s military build-up and its security guarantees from Western partners will only increase, regardless of diplomatic wording about NATO. Even if NATO membership is formally put on hold, Ukraine will emerge from this battle-hardened, armed-to-the-teeth and with deep Western defence integration – and even deeper antipathy towards Russia.
Europe will stick to higher defence spending and will continue efforts to rebuild its defence-industrial base at home. The shock of this war has fundamentally shifted European security postures; that won’t be undone by one summit or ceasefire. And any US-Russia detente may be viewed by European capitals as demanding even greater “strategic autonomy” and defence spend.
Any outcome that is perceived as rewarding Russian aggression and raw power politics will reverberate widely across capitals, within and beyond Europe. Strategic planning in most middle-power countries has long assumed the pre-eminence of the rules-based order, rather than hard-edged deterrence and defence capability, would underwrite sovereignty. A US-Russia détente would accelerate the development of new forms of closer security alignment between regional and likeminded blocs of countries.
Russia will continue pivoting economically and diplomatically toward the East. Moscow’s dependence on Beijing – for markets, technology, and diplomatic cover – will deepen. Any relief it gets from the West will be partial, so the Kremlin will keep cultivating China (and others like Iran and North Korea) while still holding coercive tools in reserve against its neighbours. Russia lost trust in the West years ago and no deal, even if it gets all it wants, will undermine its strategic assessment that broader comity is either possible or desirable – and that its interests are served by attempting to split the transatlantic alliance an pit European nations against one another.
Finally, even when the Alaska summit concludes, we may not immediately know what (if anything) was agreed. The Kremlin has already indicated, via spokesman Dmitry Peskov, that there will be no joint statement issued. So it may only become clear in the ensuing days or weeks what understandings were reached behind closed doors – and which issues remain as intractable as ever.
For Business
The Alaska summit will, of course, be most consequential for Ukrainians. But it will also carry important implications for businesses and investors worldwide.
As Michael Feller’s put it in his “What Putin Wants” assessment this past weekend, regardless of the summit’s outcome Russia will remain a high-friction, high-risk, high-reward environment. It will only be accessible for those willing to operate in the long shadow of sanctions and geopolitics. In practical terms, any outcome short of a wholesale US–Russia rapprochement will keep Russia effectively “off-index” for most institutional investors. Indeed, major index providers like MSCI deemed the Russian market “uninvestable” after the 2022 invasion, and Russia has been excluded from key emerging market benchmarks ever since. Market access to Russia will thus remain limited to niche players and often opaque channels, such as specialised funds or regional intermediaries operating outside the primary Western financial system.
Commodities and energy might see more predictable export flows if a pause or framework deal is struck – for example, grain shipments or oil exports could stabilise under an accord – but even then, contracts will remain politicised, counterparties can be unstable, and the risk of sudden policy shifts (or snap-back sanctions) will keep exit costs high.
For companies headquartered, invested, or operating in neighbouring regions (Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia), the knock-on effects will depend on how much Putin is able to consolidate his regional influence post-summit. A deal that solidifies Russia’s grip in its near abroad could empower Moscow to pressure those countries economically or politically, shaping everything from regulatory regimes to infrastructure priorities. Conversely, a stalemated or weak outcome might embolden neighbouring states to distance themselves further from Moscow’s orbit.
Either way, businesses in those adjacent markets will need to monitor exposure to Russian coercive tools – whether that’s cybersecurity threats, energy supply leverage, or shifts in trade and customs rules.
Watch Points
Given the stakes, various plausible outcomes and the high likelihood that no outcomes will be officially documented, in the aftermath of the summit businesses would be wise to monitor – as we will be doing in our daily Geopolitical Dispatch briefings – four key indicators:
1. Combat operations: Watch for escalation or de-escalation of hostilities. Particularly air strikes from Russia on Ukrainian critical infrastructure and cities.
2. Sanctions and tariff signals: An absence of new penalties (or hints of relaxing certain measures) could indicate progress, whereas immediate moves like Trump imposing more secondary tariffs on, say, Chinese goods would imply talks fell flat.
3. Allied and Ukrainian responses: Statements from European leaders and — most critically — President Zelensky will reveal how any deal is being received. Warm or cautiously positive reactions (even if terse) from NATO capitals would imply the outcome is something they can live with. Angry or alarmed responses (e.g. talk of betrayal or “no peace without justice”) would signal that Trump’s concessions to Putin, if any, are causing backlash.
4. Follow-up diplomacy: Critical here will be whether the US and Russia announce a schedule for further talks or a mechanism to carry out what was agreed (for instance, a joint task force on Ukraine). The presence of diplomatic momentum – or conversely, total silence and each side reverting to tough talk – will indicate whether the summit outcome has a real substance or was merely a one-off show.
Whatever the outcome, this summit is yet another reminder of how geopolitical forces are shaping the contours of the global business environment. That is precisely why we write Geopolitical Dispatch and why we founded Geopolitical Strategy – a specialised advisory firm to help companies map, monitor, and manage geopolitical risk.
If you think your business could benefit from a more detailed briefing on these developments – including insights from any of our senior advisors (such as former ambassadors to Russia, Germany, NATO, the EU, the WTO and the UN) – please do not hesitate to reach out.
And if you would like detailed, ongoing and strategic daily briefings to keep track of developments without drowning in media noise, if you have not already, I would encourage you to upgrade your subscription for full access.
Our advisory services include bespoke briefings by former ambassadors, scenario planning workshops and war-gaming exercises, designed to help your organisation map, monitor and manage its geopolitical risk.
In the meantime, thank you for reading Geopolitical Dispatch.
Best wishes,
Damien
Founder | Geopolitical Strategy
damien@geopolitical-strategy.com
(Please note that none of this is legal or investment advice).
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