House of the Rising Saud
Saudi Arabia’s transformation.
In this week’s Not in Dispatches, we look at Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, how it has been shaped by its four distinct historical phases, and where the Kingdom goes to from here.
It started in the desert
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a relatively recent political construct. While views of some of the locals may differ (notably Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman) most observers trace the nation-state’s modern incarnation to 1932, after the Ottoman Empire fell, and when the Al Saud family conquered the bulk of the Arabian Peninsula, giving it its modern name, literally “Arabia belonging to the Saud”.
The Arabian Peninsula has, of course, a much longer history.
Located between two great centres of ancient civilisation, the Nile River Valley and Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula historically played an important role as a centre of commerce, with its caravan routes becoming trade arteries carrying agricultural goods, spices and aromatics.
And while traders passed through, the peninsula’s great expanse of desert formed a natural barrier that protected it from invasion by its powerful neighbours. Few early empires saw value in controlling the spartan area, and, for most of its long history, the Arabian Peninsula was geopolitically insignificant.
That changed, however, with the birth of Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam.
The Arabian Peninsula gave the world its second-biggest religion (and probably its largest by the year 2100). Mecca and Medina, both situated on the Arabian Peninsula, became the two Holy Cities of Islam and the destinations for millions of pilgrims for the Hajj. The Caliphate spread over the next few centuries not only across the peninsula but as far west as Spain and as far east as the Philippines. And, along with the spread of Islam and centuries of pilgrims to Arabia, Arabic emerged as an international language of learning and government.
After the Islamic Empire broke up into smaller Muslim kingdoms in the 17th century, the Arabian Peninsula gradually entered a period of relative isolation, although Mecca and Medina remained the spiritual heart of the Islamic world. Over the next few centuries, the major cities on the Arabian Peninsula — Riyadh, Jeddah, Mecca and Medina — were ruled by different tribes. The Hashemites, for most of this period, ruled the two Holy Cities while the Saudis periodically ruled Riyadh. And, for much of this time, up until its fall after the First World War, the Ottomans exercised suzerainty over the peninsula — providing protection to pilgrims but largely leaving governance in the hands of local tribal leaders.
Modern family
A pivotal moment in the peninsula’s history came in the early 18th century, when the Muslim scholar Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab began advocating a return to the ‘original’ form of Islam.
Wahhabism was an austere brand of Sunni Islam, which strictly opposed any form of innovation (bid’ah) not evident during the Prophet’s time, including the veneration of saints, the use of icons, and the adoption of modern technology. Wahhabism may have remained just a theological interpretation of Islam had it not been for it being adopted — and co-opted — by Mohammad bin Saud, the founder of the Saudi dynasty.
Mohammad bin Saud formed a political-religious alliance with ibn Wahhab that would shape the course of Saudi Arabia’s history.
Over the next two centuries during the Ottoman period, the Saudi family twice gained control over most of the peninsula, ruling from a mud-walled fortress in Riyadh. But there were also periods where other families, including the Hashemites, controlled certain areas — and others when the Saudis were forced into exile.
After periods of gaining and losing control and retreating into exile, the Saudi family gradually wrested full control of the peninsula in the early decades of the twentieth century. In 1902, Ibn Saud, the father of the modern nation then living in Kuwait, organised a march on Riyadh — a great distance across desert tracks with only a few oases to stop at. When he got to the walls of his ancestral kingdom, he succeeded in chasing away the tribe that occupied Riyadh and declared the re-birth of “Saudi Arabia”.
After establishing a base in Riyadh, Ibn Saud captured all of the Hijaz, including Mecca and Medina in 1924 and 1925, made easier after the end of the First World War with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which had supported his enemies, the Hashemites. By 1932, the Saudi family had taken control of the entire peninsula. And under the pre-text of re-Islamising the Arabian Peninsula and using the radical religious teachings of Wahhabism, the Saudi family spread its hegemony across the Arabian peninsula.
Just add oil
Before the discovery of oil, Saudi Arabia was poor. An expanse of underpopulated desert, with a few oases here and there, it was largely barren of economy, with the exception of the Holy Cities (which attracted pilgrims) and Jeddah, the cosmopolitan cultural hub and port of entry for the Hajj. The new state extracted taxes from pilgrims and associated industries, but could barely raise revenues to support a royal lifestyle of the new king and his family.
That all changed with oil.
Unlike in many places, Saudi oil is abundant, easy to extract and found close to water, making it cheap to produce and transport. Its discovery changed the Saudi Arabian economy overnight and, from the beginning, almost 90% of Saudi income came to be derived from one singular commodity.
Oil made Saudi Arabia rich and important. By restricting or accelerating production, Saudi Arabia could influence oil prices, alter the fate of the global economy, and make it a critical partner for major powers, including the United States.
But oil also made Saudi Arabia vulnerable to market prices, with the country going through cycles of affluence and austerity.
When prices were high, the government would spend. When prices went down, the government would have to borrow money from international markets. Saudi Arabia experienced a boom in 1973 when the oil embargo tripled prices; it then became impoverished in 1986 and 2014 when prices plummeted. More recently, it has been experiencing another boom with high prices caused by the war in Ukraine and the post-pandemic global economic recovery.
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The summer of ’79
In addition to exporting oil, during the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia also began exporting its version of Islam — Wahhabism — through funding religious schools (madrassas).
This significantly accelerated with major global implications in 1979, with the siege of the Holy Mosque of Mecca, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — a confluence of geopolitical events that led to the Kingdom becoming more authoritarian at home and a greater proselytizer abroad.
In Iran, the new Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini was hostile to the Saudis, challenging their custodianship of the Holy Cities, and quickly becoming enemy number one of America, a Saudi ally.
At home, the siege of the Holy Mosque by homegrown conservative zealots created such fear and embarrassment in the House of Saud that they made a deal with the clerics that they would listen to them, impose conservative values, and unleash the religious police in exchange for protecting their rule.
And as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the House of Saud saw an opportunity to burnish its religious credentials by opposing the atheist communist infidel invaders while also sending its young zealots away to fight (and, hopefully, never come back).
Just as Saudi Arabia sent fighters to Afghanistan, so too did it ramp up funding to its madrassas in Pakistan, where it was increasingly involved in competing for influence with Iran, which wanted to export its Islamic Revolution and become not just a leader of the Shia world but also the Sunni world.
One result was the beginning of a series of proxy battles between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Riyadh and Tehran took opposite sides over the decades in the wars in Syria, Yemen and Iraq, as well as in the politics of Bahrain, Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. And while they restored relations in 2023, following a deal brokered by China, there remains a deep historical enmity and enduring mistrust on both sides.
Another result, equally significant, was the unleashing of extremist Islamic thought across the Middle East.
Saudi-funded madrassas proliferated around the world, especially in Pakistan, and became factories for producing radicalised young men ready to use violence. The madrassas supported the rise of the Taliban (“talib” means student, of the madrassas) and al-Qaida (Osama bin Laden’s father was close to the first King). From a geopolitical perspective, it is hard to judge whether Saudi Arabia’s most influential export has been oil or fundamentalism.
Let the mountain come to MBS
These are both legacies that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who became de facto leader in 2017, wants to move away from as he pursues ambitious reforms and a much more proactive foreign policy than any of his predecessors.
MBS’s Vision 2020 initiative — aimed at diversifying the Saudi economy away from oil dependence and developing public service sectors, such as health, education, infrastructure and tourism — may well be the boldest economic transformation plan in the world today. MBS, wanting to avoid Saudi Arabia’s economic fortunes fluctuating according to oil prices and any possible reduction in oil demand from the energy transition, is trying to make Saudi Arabia more Texas than Russia, and more Dubai than Kabul.
Since coming to power, MBS has initiated significant changes, including the partial privatisation of Aramco – the Kingdom’s state oil firm – the introduction of new taxes, and the promotion of foreign investment. Socially, the reforms have been profound, particularly for women, who have gained the right to drive and more freedom in public life (though there’s still work to be done, as the sentencing of a fitness instructor on terrorism charges this week has shown). And today, Saudis and foreigners can dance in the streets, go to the cinema and theatre, and enjoy sports — activities that were imaginable even ten years ago.
But Saudi Arabia remains a dictatorship and an absolute monarchy.
Certain societal freedoms are allowed, but citizens are denied almost every political and civic right. MBS has also cracked down on dissent, consolidated power (including through rounding up all potential challengers in the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton until they swore allegiance), and continued to show little tolerance of press freedoms (as the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi brutally showed).
MBS’s foreign policy is equally ambitious.
The Crown Prince has repositioned Saudi Arabia with a more assertive stance — playing a bloody albeit ultimately ineffective role in the war in Yemen. He has sought to reduce regional tensions, including by restoring relations with Qatar in 2021 and Iran in 2023 and trying to restore relations with Israel before efforts were scuppered by the Gaza war. And he has recalibrated relations with the major powers — the US, China, and Russia — while also trying to soften the country’s image through extensive “soft power” efforts.
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Thy Kingdom come
Fundamentally, Saudi Arabia is in nation-building mode, with a goal of becoming a much more significant player — and not just a gas pump for the world. The country has invested massively in sports and cultural diplomacy, buying and building world-class teams, bidding for (and winning) major events, and even purchasing whole sports leagues, such as the LIV golf franchise. It is building a world-class critical raw minerals industry as the US looks to de-risk from China through ‘friend-shoring’. It is diversifying not just its economy, but also its foreign relationships — it has been accepted into BRICS this year. And it is increasingly positioning itself as a leader not just of the Middle East and Islam, but of the Global South.
Saudi Arabia’s modern ambitions — creating an economy diversified away from oil and playing a major leadership role both regionally and globally — are not without their challenges.
As its young, educated and increasingly cosmopolitan population gain more social rights, they may come to expect concomitant political rights and there could yet be backlash from more conservative elements. MBS’s mega-projects, such as building brand new cities like NEOM, will hinge on completion during the current oil boom and continued buy-in from the elites and broader population. Turning Saudi Arabia into an attractive country will require more than buying up soccer teams, golf leagues and tennis tournaments. And it remains to be seen if anyone, especially foreigners, actually wants to live in MBS’s techno-utopias in the desert. Finally, the country remains massively reliant on foreign talent as many Saudis are still unused to working.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has probably made more progress than any other country in the past ten years in increasing its geopolitical, economic, and cultural power. As the war in Gaza hurtles towards some kind of conclusion, the centre of Eurasia shifts from Moscow to Beijing, and challengers to the Middle Eastern order, like Iran and Turkey, seek to fill a US-shaped void, Saudi Arabia will loom larger than perhaps any time since its halcyon oil boom years of 1973.
And in an increasingly multipolar world, if its efforts succeed, the Kingdom is well-poised to be a significant pole not just in its region, but in the new world order.