Irregular: Victory Day
Putin and Xi on Red Square
Hello from Sydney,
In today’s Irregular column, I would like to draw your attention to the below insightful piece written by Philipp Ivanov, a world-class foreign policy advisor with particular expertise in China, Russia and Sino-Russian relations – and a senior advisor with Geopolitical Strategy.
Philipp’s piece expertly delves into one of the most significant geopolitical developments of the past decade – the deepening alliance between Russia and China – that is at the heart of the epochal shift in the global order, with myriad systemic consequences for international security and the future shape of the global economy.
By way of introduction, I would just underscore how significant Victory Day is in Russia’s collective imagination and to President Putin in particular. Victory Day was originally celebrated in Europe and Russia on different dates (8 and 9 May, respectively) for the banal reason that Nazi Germany surrendered late in the evening in 1945 in France which — with the time difference — was early morning in Moscow. But over time, the different dates gained greater importance, with the Soviet Union making it a cornerstone of national identity and Vladimir Putin deliberately elevating it into a central pillar of his government’s ideological legitimacy, foreign policy narrative, and popular support through what the author Boris Akunin calls the “militarisation of memory”.
When I was posted as a diplomat in Moscow, the world leaders attending were hardly numerous nor in the first rank – only the president of Kazakhstan came in 2016, only the president of Moldova in 2017, the Israeli and Serbian leaders attended in 2018, and the Kazakh leader once again in 2019. Covid, then Russia’s isolation following its invasion of Ukraine, rained on subsequent parades. Few global leaders wanted any association with either Putin or his tanks.
So Xi Jinping attending this year – along with 28 other foreign leaders, including those of Brazil and, rather than Israel, Palestine – is a barometer of Russia’s growing global relationships, continued isolation from the West, and its broader pivot towards the Global South and post-Soviet allies. And perhaps most importantly, its deepening relationship with China.
In this context, below is Philipp Ivanov’s piece on precisely that topic. If you find this useful, you can contact Philipp or me to arrange a private briefing.
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The world built by Putin and Xi
By Philipp Ivanov
Later today, on 9 May, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will stand solemnly on Moscow’s Red Square and watch Russian and Chinese troops marching past them to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. Putin and Xi will survey more than a military parade, but the contours of the new world order they have been building for decades.
Despite the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, economic headwinds, and the unpredictability of Trump's presidency, China and Russia are closer than ever. The two largest Eurasian powers are not only in peace with each other but deeply aligned economically and strategically. More importantly, over the last decade they have proved that a multipolar world they have long sought to construct is a reality.
Moscow and Beijing laid the foundations of a new system – based on major-power competition, transactional diplomacy, spheres of influence, diversification of global trade and financial systems, and empowerment of the Global South. Both accept that the new system will be more competitive, more fragmented and less predictable, but it’s a price they are willing to pay for the world in which their main rival – the United States – can no longer dictate the rules.
While China is clearly the leader of the new system and its chief economic enabler, Russia has proved to be a powerful partner. With China’s support, Moscow managed to survive under enormous Western pressure over the war in Ukraine. It showed the world the limitations of Western economic, diplomatic and technological power.
Beijing and Moscow’s “no-limit partnership” has also led to the expansion of BRICS – a loose network of major and middle non-Western powers betting on the expanding collective economic and strategic weight of China, India, Russia and the Global South. China and Russia also lead the charge for de-dollarisation and diversification of global trade and financial infrastructure – away from the West. Across Eurasia and beyond, China and Russia are building trade routes, infrastructure projects, digital standards and security partnerships that connect countries and regions to the alternative poles of power in Beijing and Moscow. More significantly, they provide smaller nations with diplomatic, security and economic hedging options, reducing the gravitational pull of Western institutions.
But not all is going well in the China-Russia world. Despite many points of alignment, Russia and China are driven apart by a deep-seated mistrust, power asymmetry and contesting interests.
Beijing's discomfort with Moscow's destabilising aggression in Ukraine reveals a fundamental divergence in strategy and culture. China's preference for systemic transformation through economic leverage contrasts sharply with Russia's willingness to employ military force to reshape regional order in its neighbourhood. Xi Jinping may find Putin's brinkmanship useful for distracting American attention, but Chinese leaders harbour no illusions about the costs of association with Russia's more provocative actions.
Beijing and Moscow are also competing in the overlapping spheres of interest – from Central Asia to the Arctic. Moscow resents being an economic minnow in the relationship, highly dependent on Beijing’s largesse. As fiercely independent powers, China and Russia understand the limits of their alignment. There may come a moment when China and Russia present a more formidable challenge to each other than to the West.
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For the most part since the end of the Second World War, at least for Western businesses, that geopolitical context has been like clear, calm, stable waters — a context that allowed for supply chain stability, smooth international logistics and operations, safe passage into new markets, accurate pricing or risk, confidence in capital allocation, relatively stable currencies and financial frameworks, and predictable rules, secure property rights and enforceable contracts.
But for now, the benefits of the China-Russia partnership far outweigh the risks. The Chinese and Russian economies are highly complementary, and their strategic interests largely align. Importantly, their 4000-kilometer land border is peaceful.
The partnership also persists because both powers perceive American decline as inevitable and irreversible. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's economic decoupling represent calculated bets that US primacy is faltering. Trump's presidency — with its erratic policies, threats to allies, and willingness to upend international norms — appears to validate their assessment that American leadership is waning.
The current trade war with Trump is China’s Crimea moment. It is a major test to the resilience of the Chinese economic miracle which lies at the heart of the new multipolar world. When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Western response was muted — sanctions and a partial diplomatic freeze. Emboldened, Russia continued its quest. China has learnt a lot from Russia’s experiences. Some lessons – sanctions-busting, rapid trade diversification, emergency monetary policy responses, shadow trade fleet – may be applicable to China. But the scale is different. Russia is a relatively minor economy. China is an economic giant fuelling and feeding from the global economic system.
Chinese leadership considers Trump’s tariffs a rehearsal for what may come next, if a military showdown with the US, severe sanctions and economic and a technological blockade cannot be avoided. If the hit from tariffs on the Chinese economy is manageable, and its exports find new markets and loopholes in the American tariff wall — the damage to the US global economic standing and a boost to Beijing’s will be long-lasting. It will be another nail in the coffin of American exceptionalism.
The stakes for Beijing and Moscow in the competition with the US could not be higher. Both are quietly confident. After all, they knew it would come to this. For more than a decade, China has been steadily decoupling from the US by growing new markets, building sovereign technologies and plugging economic vulnerabilities. Russia – while far less strategic and secure economically than China — has also been readying itself for a long-term confrontation with the West. Both will now watch wearily if their fortresses will hold under Trump’s pressure.
Yet the ultimate success of their project remains uncertain. The resilience of Western institutions, the adaptability of market democracies, and the inherent tensions in the Russia-China partnership suggest that declarations of a truly post-American world order may prove premature. What is undeniable, however, is that we now operate in a global system where Beijing and Moscow have secured veto power over outcomes that matter to them — a remarkable achievement that few would have predicted when their partnership began.
Standing together on the Red Square, Putin and Xi must ponder if their mission to rebuild the world order is succeeding. In some way, we are already living in the world built by Putin and Xi. The US threats to invade Greenland, take over the Panama Canal, or withdraw from NATO, coupled with trade tariffs slapped on friends and foes alike were inconceivable last year. Now they are an everyday reality. Russia and China may assume — rightly or wrongly — that the US behaviour of the last 100 days is a testament to that the multipolar world has truly arrived.
I hope you found that piece interesting, insightful and useful.
Best wishes
Damien
Co-Founder & CEO, Geopolitical Strategy
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This is a finely articulated assessment of a deepening axis, one that undeniably alters the global power equation. The China-Russia partnership reflects a pragmatic alignment rooted not in shared values but in shared adversaries and overlapping interests. It is, in many ways, a rational response to an increasingly fragmented global order, and a West that often overestimates the universal appeal of its model while underestimating the appeal of alternatives.
Yet the partnership’s celebrated cohesion masks structural fault lines. Power asymmetry, competing ambitions in Central Asia and the Arctic, and divergent methods of influence—economic inducement versus coercive force—ensure that this is not a true alliance but a marriage of convenience. History suggests such arrangements do not endure once external threats recede or interests diverge. For now, this partnership is strategically potent; however, its long-term coherence remains far from guaranteed.