Russian rules of thumb.
Finding the signal after a noisy week.
In this week’s edition of Not in Dispatches, we wanted to revisit a bit of what we covered last weekend, and in the days since: Russia.
Last week’s mutiny led by Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin was undoubtedly a significant event – the first serious challenge to Putin’s rule since he took power 23 years ago.
There has since been a flurry of analysis and many predictions made – including what it means for Putin’s future, Russia’s political system, and the war in Ukraine.
What will transpire is impossible to predict. So, instead of drawing definitive conclusions, we thought it would be more useful to offer some rules of thumb when thinking about Russian politics and foreign policy.
The following rules – drawn from one of our co-author’s time as a diplomat in Moscow and years of closely following Russian politics – may help readers step back from the news and understand the fundamental dynamics.
Rule 1: The tsar does not control everything. The mutiny dispelled the myth of Putin’s omnipotence. Putin rules not by diktat but by arbitrating disputes among elites, allocating resources, and keeping everyone in balance. Over the past two decades, institutions have been hollowed out and serve as instruments of this highly personalised system of “manual control”. While Putin remains the most powerful political actor, his role is more that of arbiter among warring factions than a Stalin-like figure, with direct command and control.
Rule 2: Russian politics is a Game of Thrones. While Putin remains the ‘godfather’, Russian politics is best viewed as a brutal competition between feudal lords atop a technocratic bureaucracy. Some of these elites can be characterised as warlords (Prigozhin and Shoigu); some are retail politicians (Medvedev, Navalny and Sobyanin); some are oligarchs (Deripaska and Sechin); and then there are the siloviki (Naryshkin and Patrushev), who run the security services. Russian policy positions, whether domestic or foreign, are often what is left after the battles between these elites have been won or settled.
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Rule 3: Putin’s primary concern is survival. Russian leaders tend not to leave power voluntarily. For Putin, keeping the peace means keeping his head. Priority number two is keeping the immense, diverse country together. “Stability” is Putin’s watchword and has always been his main appeal. That means keeping elites in check so that no one can threaten his rule. But it also means avoiding anarchy in a country that suffered chaos after 1917 and 1991. For years, Putin’s legitimacy derived from the public’s assumption that only he could hold Russia together. Many elites and those in the general populace are now questioning whether that remains true.
Rule 4: Russia has an empire state of mind. Putin’s Russia is built on its traditional imperial values of authority, orthodoxy and nationalism – not Western values of democracy, secularism and cosmopolitanism. In foreign policy, the imperial priority is to restore Russia as a great power – respected and impossible to ignore, an equal to the United States and China, and with its own sphere of influence. Russia also sees itself as the leader of a civilisation – of the Russian-speaking world, of Christian Orthodoxy (the “Third Rome”) and “traditional values” under siege from a ‘woke’ West. Angela Merkel got it right: Putin is a 19th-century leader in a 21st-century world.
Rule 5: The state is supreme. Ever since the Russian state was built in the 15th century in the wake of Mongol vassalage, it has operated on two cardinal principles: an absolute centralisation of power and the sacralisation of the ruler. Russian schoolchildren are typically taught that the only way to govern such a huge territory is through a strong ruler. Federalism has never been tested. Nor really has democracy or accountability. Putin rebuilt a centralised, sacrilised form of government after the collapse of the Soviet Union, its breakup and the near collapse of the state. For him, this was a historical tragedy to be reversed by restoring a strong army, subordinating institutions to his will, and empowering the intelligence agencies, which are the most powerful and important instruments of state.
Rule 6: Russia’s default mode is to expand. Imperial expansionism has defined the Russian state for so much of its history. With no natural borders, Russia has tended to advance its security by keeping neighbouring countries weak and by fighting wars abroad to keep hostile powers at bay. Ukraine – a flat and fertile “borderland” – has for centuries been a conduit not only for Western ideas and technologies but also invaders (including the Poles, Swedes, Prussians, Napoleon and Hitler). In light of history, the sincere – even if paranoid – view from Moscow is that Western influence and a potential NATO presence in Ukraine were genuine threats. Expanding Russian territory was thus a natural response.
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Rule 7: Economic concerns are secondary. Unlike in the West, Russian rulers, including Putin, do not prioritise growth and incrementally raising living standards. They favour economic security via autarky. The state hoovers up resources (oil, gas and minerals) and allocates them to elites for patronage. Monetary policy is designed to weather shocks from external enemies. Trade relations are developed to reduce dependence on the West. Russians are used to economising with money and choice. Where security and economics collide, security always trumps. Hence sanctions are not only tolerated but used to shift trade to Asia, reduce dependence on imports, develop local industries, and blame the West for the country’s woes.
Rule 8: Popular opinion barely matters. Russia may have the trappings of democracy, but a democracy it is not. The tsar must still remain popular for legitimacy. But unlike Western leaders, Putin does not make decisions based on opinion polls. Russians also tend to rally around the tsar. They are patriots and can endure a lot of suffering in support of the state. Further, Russian political culture tends to be fatalistic and politically passive. Whatever gripes Russians have about Putin and the state, they will unlikely push for change. Most people accept the system, do not believe it can change, and keep their heads down. They certainly do not want a revolution. And those who push for reform – the intelligentsia, the “cultural class”, journalists and civil society – have largely been suppressed or have emigrated.
Rule 9: It can always get crazier. Shooting down a passenger airline over the Donbas. Poisoning turncoats abroad with biological weapons. Trying to take Kyiv. Blowing up a dam. A mercenary group led by a former hot dog vendor attempting a mutiny and threatening insurrection. Russia believes in “peak crazy” as much as it does in “peak oil” – its reserves are far from depleted.
Rule 10: Nobody actually knows what’s going on. Kremlinology is a dark art. The main players keep their cards to their chest, and often even they cannot predict events. The Kremlin constantly lies. Russian television is mostly propaganda. Independent media has been stifled. Foreign correspondents are, quite rightly, too scared to enter the country. Take information with a grain of salt and confident predictions with a jar of pickles.
What’s next? Not even Putin knows. But we will be watching for further developments to cover each weekday in our Daily Assessment.
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Best,
Michael Feller, Cameron Grant, and Damien Bruckard, co-authors
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