Week signals: Devil at the crossroads
Week signals: Devil at the crossroads
Plus: watch points for France, Hungary, the Czech Republic, South Asia, and the Freely Associated States.
This week:
IN REVIEW. Inflection points for Israel and Ukraine.
UP AHEAD. Barnier's new government, Orban's old tricks, elections in Prague, tensions on India's periphery, and neglected risks in the Pacific.
The Week in Review: Long-range missiles, short-term thinking
History may look back at this week as something of a crossroads. Not for Tuesday’s debate. Few (Taylor Swift aside) will have changed their minds. But events in Gaza and Ukraine suggest an inflection point in today’s biggest crises.
In Gaza, we saw the most genuine sign of compromise from Israel yet, with the offer of safe passage to Yahya Sinwar if remaining hostages are returned. Hamas has rejected this, but the offer of not dying in a ditch (or tunnel) must be tempting to even the most hardened fanatic. And what we can read from it is that Israel may be nearing an end to its campaign. Hamas has been neutralised in Rafah. The IDF is close to victory in other centres. The question is whether Iran, Hezbollah or the Houthis will be willing to accept the end of Hamas, or will want the war revived in other theatres. We suspect they're also sick of fighting (though Iran may still want symbolic revenge for the death of Ismail Haniyeh). And we suspect the US suspects this too. The USS Theodore Roosevelt left the Middle East earlier this week.
In Ukraine, another fork in the road looms. Russia is closing in on Pokrovsk, which could give it control of the entire Donbas and the lands east of the Dnieper River. Its belated counteroffensive in Kursk has begun. Victories in both regions would presumably satisfy Vladimir Putin’s war aims and it’s thus no surprise that multiple powers, from China to Germany, are signalling now is the time for negotiations. Yet others, in Britain, Congress and of course Ukraine, are holding out for a new level of capability. Noting the political pressure, Joe Biden is reportedly considering whether to grant Ukraine use of long-range missiles inside Russia. Putin says this will drag NATO into the war. He’s said similar things before, but we don’t think he’s bluffing this time. And even if he is, we don’t think many in the Kremlin will tolerate such a bluff if an American ATACMS or a British Storm Shadow missile hits a target deep inside Russia.
You may not like Putin, but you can acknowledge his dilemma. A missile strike on Russia is less likely to be a form of deterrence than a cause for escalation (e.g., an equivalent strike on a NATO targe, or a nuclear test). A Ukrainian missile strike, which would necessarily involve NATO positioning and personnel (not just equipment), would vindicate his argument that Russia is not so much fighting its Ukrainian brethren, but the greater West. It would also force him to reconsider the strength of his own deterrence (e.g., nuclear threats). Simply put, he can less risk having his bluff called this time than he could when it came to NATO’s other responses, from arms in the early days, to F-16s recently.
We’re thus more worried than usual about this present moment, and we think it would be prudent for you to